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Abstract
Existing domain generalization methods for face anti-
spoofing endeavor to extract common differentiation fea-
tures to improve the generalization. However, due to large
distribution discrepancies among fake faces of different do-
mains, it is difficult to seek a compact and generalized fea-
ture space for the fake faces. In this work, we propose
an end-to-end single-side domain generalization framework
(SSDG) to improve the generalization ability of face anti-
spoofing. The main idea is to learn a generalized feature
space, where the feature distribution of the real faces is
compact while that of the fake ones is dispersed among
domains but compact within each domain. Specifically, a
feature generator is trained to make only the real faces
from different domains undistinguishable, but not for the
fake ones, thus forming a single-side adversarial learning.
Moreover, an asymmetric triplet loss is designed to con-
strain the fake faces of different domains separated while
the real ones aggregated. The above two points are inte-
grated into a unified framework in an end-to-end training
manner, resulting in a more generalized class boundary, es-
pecially good for samples from novel domains. Feature and
weight normalization is incorporated to further improve the
generalization ability. Extensive experiments show that our
proposed approach is effective and outperforms the state-
of-the-art methods on four public databases. The code is
released online1.
1. Introduction
In recent years, face recognition techniques have been
widely exploited in our daily life, especially in the fields
of smartphones login, access control, etc. However, many
presentation attacks have emerged (e.g., print attack, video
attack, and 3D mask attack), which has led to a huge secu-
1https://github.com/taylover-pei/SSDG-CVPR2020
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Figure 1. Left: Conventional domain generalization methods align
source domains to learn a shared feature space, which fail to get a
discriminative class boundary on the unseen domain. Right: Our
single-side domain generalization method aggregates all the real
examples while separates the fake ones from different domains to
learn a class boundary, generalizing better to the novel domain.
rity risk on face recognition systems and become an increas-
ingly critical concern in the face recognition field. To tackle
this issue, various face anti-spoofing methods have been
proposed, which can be coarsely categorized into texture-
based methods and temporal-based methods. The texture-
based methods utilize hand-craft descriptors or data-driven
deep learning to extract texture cues discriminative between
the real faces and the fake ones, such as the color [5], dis-
tortion cues [11, 39], etc. In contrast, the temporal-based
methods leverage various temporal cues in consecutive face
frames, such as rPPG [20, 21] and optical flow [2, 4].
Although existing state-of-the-art methods have obtained
promising results under intra-database testing scenarios,
they cannot generalize well in case of cross-database test-
ing, where training (source domain2) and testing (target do-
2The term domain in this paper represents a database.
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main) data come from different domains. The reason be-
hind is that traditional methods take no consideration of the
intrinsic distribution relationship among different domains
and thus extract discriminative features of database biased
[35], leading to poor generalization to unseen domains.
To address the problem, recent face anti-spoofing methods
[19, 38] adopt domain adaptation techniques to minimize
the distribution discrepancy between the source and the tar-
get domain by utilizing unlabeled target data. However, in
many real-world scenarios, it is difficult and expensive to
collect a lot of unlabeled target data for training, and even
no information about the target domain is available.
Therefore, some researchers start to address the face
anti-spoofing problem from the perspective of domain gen-
eralization (DG), which aims to train a model by utilizing
multiple existing source domains without seeing any target
data. Conventional DG approaches [18, 33] aim to learn
a generalized feature space by aligning the distributions
among multiple source domains. And they assume that the
extracted features of unseen faces can be mapped nearby
the shared feature space so that the model can generalize
well to the novel domains. Since the real faces from both
the source and the target domains are collected by imaging
real people, their distribution discrepancies are small, which
makes it relatively easy to learn a compact feature space. In
contrast, due to the diversity of attack types and collecting
ways, it is relatively hard to aggregate the features of fake
faces from different domains together. Therefore, seeking
a generalized feature space for the fake faces is difficult to
optimize and may also affect the classification accuracy for
the target domain [1, 40]. For this reason, as illustrated in
the left of Figure 1, although a compact feature space for
both the real and the fake examples is achieved, it still fails
to learn a discriminative class boundary for the novel target
domain. In consideration of the above arguments, besides
constraining the real faces and the fake ones to be as distin-
guishable as possible, we propose to pull all the real faces
aggregated while push the fake ones of different domains
separated. As illustrated in the right of Figure 1, our method
aims at forcing the features of fake faces more dispersed in
the feature space while those of the real ones more compact,
thus leading to a class boundary, which generalizes better to
the target domain.
With the above thoughts in mind, we propose an end-to-
end single-side domain generalization framework (SSDG),
as shown in Figure 2. Specifically, a feature generator is
trained competing with a domain discriminator to make the
features of real faces from different domains undistinguish-
able, forming a single-side adversarial learning. Since the
fake faces are rather diverse than the real ones, we treat the
fake faces of different domains as different categories while
the real ones of all domains as the other category to perform
the asymmetric triplet mining, which ensures three proper-
ties: 1) fake faces of different categories are separated; 2)
all the real ones regardless of domains are aggregated; 3)
all the real faces and the fake ones are distinguishable. As
a result, two feature distributions with different character-
istics can be achieved, leading to a better generalized class
boundary for the target domains. Meanwhile, feature and
weight normalization is incorporated to further improve the
generalization ability during training.
The main contributions of this work are summarized as
follows: 1) Based on the analysis that the fake faces are
rather diverse than the real ones, we propose a novel end-
to-end single-side domain generalization framework. 2) We
design the single-side adversarial learning and the asym-
metric triplet loss to achieve different optimization goals
for the real and the fake faces and perform the feature and
weight normalization to further improve the performance.
3) We make comprehensive comparisons and achieve the
state-of-the-art performance on four public databases.
2. Related Work
2.1. Face Anti-spoofing Methods
In this subsection, we review the most representative
face anti-spoofing methods, which can be generally divided
into two groups: texture-based methods and temporal-based
methods, as already mentioned previously.
Texture-based methods distinguish the real faces from
the fake ones through various texture cues. Many prior
works adopt hand-craft descriptors for face anti-spoofing,
such as LBP [9, 26], HOG [14], SURF [5], SIFT [29], etc.
In recent years, with the rapid development of deep learning
in computer vision, various methods turn to employ CNNs
to extract more discriminative features. Yang et al. [42] are
the first to use CNN with binary supervision for face anti-
spoofing. Atoum et al. [3] propose a two-stream CNN ar-
chitecture to extract depth features combining with the tex-
ture features to detect attacks. And the face de-spoofing
method [16] inversely decomposes a spoof face into a live
face and a spoof noise for classification.
Temporal-based methods make use of temporal cues in
consecutive face frames for spoofing face detection. Mouth-
motion detection [17] and eye-blinking detection [28, 34]
are among the earliest solutions for face anti-spoofing based
on the temporal cues. Recently, there exist more general
methods relying on more effective temporal cues, instead
of the particular liveness information. CNN-LSTM archi-
tecture is proposed in [41] to take multiple frames as input
to extract temporal features for face anti-spoofing. Liu et al.
[23] utilize the rPPG signal as the auxiliary supervision with
a novel CNN-RNN network to detect attacks. More robust
rPPG features are extracted by [20, 21] to detect 3D mask
attack effectively. And Yang et al. [43] take into considera-
tion the global temporal and local spatial cues to distinguish
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Figure 2. An overview of the proposed method. The input faces with different color borders represent examples of different domains. The
parameter sharing feature generator is trained to make the feature distributions of different domains undistinguishable for the real faces but
not for the fake ones under the single-side adversarial learning. Moreover, the asymmetric triplet mining is implemented to separate the
fake faces while aggregate the real ones of different domains to force the features of fake faces to be more dispersed in the feature space.
The feature and weight normalization is incorporated to further improve the generalization ability.
the real faces from the fake ones.
Although the above methods have obtained remarkable
results under intra-database testing scenarios, they cannot
mine the distribution relationship among different domains
and might suffer from extracting database-biased features,
leading to poor generalization to unseen domains.
2.2. Domain Generalization
Both the domain adaptation methods [19, 36, 38] and
zero-shot face anti-spoofing methods [24, 30] aim to im-
prove the generalization ability. In contrast, the domain
generalization (DG) methods explicitly mine the relation-
ship among multiple source domains without accessing any
target data, which generalize better to unseen domains.
Most of the previous DG methods focus on minimizing the
distribution discrepancies among multiple source domains
to extract domain-invariant features. Motiian et al. [27]
propose a new loss to guide the features of the same class
to be close in the latent feature space. Autoencoders are
exploited in [13, 18] to align the distributions of source do-
mains for generalized features. The most related work to
ours is proposed in [33], where multiple feature extractors
are trained to learn a generalized feature space via adver-
sarial learning. However, as the first attempt to address the
face anti-spoofing problem from the DG point of view, its
training process is not end-to-end. Moreover, due to the di-
versity of attack types and collecting ways, it is difficult to
seek a generalized feature space for the fake faces, usually
leading to a sub-optimal solution for face anti-spoofing.
3. Proposed Method
3.1. Overview
Since the distribution discrepancies are much larger
among the fake faces than the real ones, it is nontrivial
to align the features of fake faces from different domains.
Therefore, seeking a compact and generalized feature space
for both the real and the fake faces is difficult to optimize
and may bring negative influences on the classification ac-
curacy for unseen domains. In this work, we focus on asym-
metric optimization goals for the real and the fake faces be-
longing to different domains to learn a feature space with
higher generalization ability to unseen domains. As illus-
trated in Figure 2, we propose a single-side domain general-
ization framework (SSDG) for face anti-spoofing. Specifi-
cally, the feature generator is trained competing with the do-
main discriminator to make the features of real faces undis-
tinguishable, forming a single-side adversarial learning pro-
cess. Moreover, we propose the asymmetric triplet loss to
explicitly separate the fake faces of different domains while
aggregate the real ones. Additionally, feature and weight
normalization is further incorporated to improve the gener-
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Figure 3. Illustration of the asymmetric triplet loss. A shape with the black border represents the anchor point, while the other two points
linked with it are the positive and the negative ones, respectively. Asymmetric triplet mining is conducted to separate the fake faces of
different domains while aggregate the real ones together. Meanwhile, the fake faces are also pulled apart away from all the real ones. After
adopting the asymmetric triplet loss, the features of fake faces can be more dispersed in the feature space, leading to a class boundary better
generalized.
alization ability during the training process. Therefore, the
proposed SSDG method forces the fake faces to be more
dispersed in the feature space while the real ones to be more
compact, leading to a more generalized class boundary to
unseen domains.
3.2. Single-Side Adversarial Learning
Assume there are N source domains, denoted as D =
{D1, D2, ..., DN}. Each of them contains two categories
of face images, i.e., the real faces Xr and the fake faces
Xf . Since all the real faces are collected by imaging real
people, we conjecture that the distribution discrepancies
among them are much smaller compared to the fake ones.
Therefore, seeking a generalized feature space for the real
faces is relatively easy, which promotes to capture more
common discriminative cues. Specifically, we propose the
single-side adversarial learning to learn a generalized fea-
ture space, which is conducted only on the extracted fea-
tures of real faces. In contrast, the adversarial learning is
not performed for the fake ones.
We firstly separate the real faces from the fake ones of all
source domains, and then feed them into the corresponding
feature generators, which transform the input faces into a
latent feature space as follows:
Zr = Gr(Xr), Zf = Gf (Xf ), (1)
where Gr, Gf represent the feature generators for the real
and the fake faces, respectively, and Zr, Zf are the cor-
responding extracted features. Since a parameter sharing
strategy is adopted to make all the parameters of Gr and
Gf identical, we refer them collectively as G in the follow-
ing for the sake of convenience. The domain discriminator,
denoted as D, is implemented based on Zr to determine
which source domain the input features stem from. On the
contrary, the feature generator is trained to spoof the do-
main discriminator so that the domain labels cannot be rec-
ognized. Therefore, a single-side adversarial learning pro-
cedure is designed between the feature generator and the
domain discriminator to learn a generalized feature space
for the real faces. During the learning procedure, the pa-
rameters of feature generator are optimized by maximizing
the loss of domain discriminator while those of domain dis-
criminator are optimized with the opposite objective. Since
there are multiple source domains for classification, we uti-
lize the standard cross-entropy loss to optimize the network
under the single-side adversarial learning:
min
D
max
G
LAda(G,D) =
− Ex,y∼Xr,YD
∑N
n=1
1[n=y] logD(G(x)),
(2)
where YD represents the set of domain labels.
In order to optimize the feature generator and the do-
main discriminator simultaneously, a gradient reverse layer
(GRL) [12] is inserted after the feature generator, which
multiplies the gradient of the adversarial loss by −λ during
backward propagation. We set λ = 21+exp (−10k) − 1 and
k = current iterstotal iters with the same purpose introduced by [12]
to suppress the effect of the noisy signals at the early train-
ing stage. With the single-side adversarial learning, a gen-
eralized feature space for the real faces is achieved, where
common discriminative cues can be further exploited.
3.3. Asymmetric Triplet Mining
Due to the diversity of attack types and database col-
lection ways, the distribution discrepancies are much larger
among the fake faces than the real ones. Therefore, seeking
a dispersed feature space for the fake is relatively easy com-
pared to seeking a compact one. In consideration of this,
we explicitly separate the fake faces of different domains to
force them to be more dispersed in the feature space. In con-
trast, we aggregate all the real ones to force them to be more
compact. To achieve the asymmetric optimization goals for
the real and fake faces, we propose the asymmetric triplet
loss to perform the asymmetric triplet mining according to
the categories, which promotes to learn a better class bound-
ary for unseen domains.
Specifically, assuming there are three source domains
available, we recombine the real and the fake faces com-
ing from three different domains into four categories. As
shown in the left of Figure 3, the fake faces of three differ-
ent domains are treated as distinct categories (circle, square,
and triangle, respectively), while all the real ones are put
together into one category (cross). And then, four-category
asymmetric triplet mining is conducted on the real and the
fake faces to achieve the following optimization goals: 1)
separate the fake faces of different domains; 2) aggregate
the real faces of all source domains; 3) pull apart the fake
faces away from all the real ones. After that, as shown in
the right of Figure 3, the extracted features of fake faces are
more dispersed than before in the feature space and those
of real ones are more aggregated, leading to a better gen-
eralized class boundary for unseen domains. The feature
generator is optimized as follows:
min
G
LAsTrip(G) =
∑
xai ,x
p
i ,x
n
i
(‖f (xai )− f (xpi )‖22
− ‖f (xai )− f (xni )‖22 + α),
(3)
where the labels of anchor xai and positive example x
p
i are
the same, while those of xai and negative example x
n
i are
different. The α is a pre-defined margin.
3.4. Feature and Weight Normalization
Normalization approaches have been verified effective
in the field of face recognition. In this work, both feature
normalization and weight normalization are incorporated to
further improve the generalization ability of the proposed
method.
Feature Normalization. The feature norms are highly
related to the quality of the images, as discussed in [31, 37].
Due to the diversity of database collecting conditions (e.g.,
illustration, camera quality, etc.), large differences exist
among the feature norms of different face images under
both the intra-database and cross-database scenarios, which
hinder the feature learning process and also affect the gen-
eralization ability. Thus, we perform the l2 normalization
on the outputs of the feature generator to constrain all the
features share the same Euclidean norm to further improve
the performance of face anti-spoofing.
Weight Normalization. In this work, the face anti-
spoofing problem is regarded as a binary classification task.
Since the softmax function is utilized for training, the deci-
sion boundary can be achieved between the real and the fake
faces as ‖W T1 ‖‖z˜‖ cos(θ1)+b1 = ‖W T0 ‖‖z˜‖ cos(θ0)+b0,
whereWi is the i-th column of the parameter matrix in last
fully connected layer, bi is the corresponding bias, and θi is
the angle between the normalized feature z˜ and Wi. Fol-
lowing the works of [10, 22, 37], we perform l2 normaliza-
tion onWi to fix ‖W i‖ = 1 and set bi = 0, which makes
the decision boundary becomes cos(θ1) − cos(θ0) = 0.
Therefore, we further constrain the feature learning process
by the weight normalization, which promotes to learn more
discriminative cues between the real and the fake faces.
3.5. Loss Function
Since all the source domain data contain labels, a face
anti-spoofing classifier is implemented after the feature gen-
erator, as illustrated in Figure 2. Both the face anti-spoofing
classifier and the feature generator are optimized by the
standard cross-entropy loss, denoted as LCls. Integrating
all things mentioned above together, the objective of the
proposed single-side domain generalization framework for
face anti-spoofing is:
LSSDG = LCls + λ1LAda + λ2LAsTrip, (4)
where λ1 and λ2 are the balanced parameters. Instead of
decomposing the training process into two phases in [33],
we train all the components in an end-to-end manner.
4. Experiment
4.1. Experimental Settings
Databases. Four public face anti-spoofing databases are
utilized to evaluate the effectiveness of our method: OULU-
NPU [7] (denoted as O), CASIA-FASD [45] (denoted as C),
Idiap Replay-Attack [8] (denoted as I), and MSU-MFSD
[39] (denoted as M). We randomly select one database as
the target domain for testing and the remaining three as the
source domains for training. Thus, we have four testing
tasks in total: O&C&I to M, O&M&I to C, O&C&M to I,
and I&C&M to O. Many differences (e.g., background, res-
olution, illustration, ethnicity, etc.) exist under both intra-
database and cross-database testing scenarios, especially for
the fake ones, which cause great distribution discrepancies
among them.
Implementation Details. MTCNN algorithm [44] is
adopted for face detection and face alignment to perform
the data pre-processing. All the detected faces are normal-
ized to 256×256×3 as the input of the network, where only
RGB channels are utilized for training to further reduce the
network complexity. We train our model using only one
frame information randomly selected from each video. The
SGD optimizer with momentum of 0.9 and weight decay of
5e-4 is used for the optimization. The hyperparameter α is
set to 0.1.
Table 1. Evaluations of different components of the proposed method with different architectures.
Method O&C&I to M O&M&I to C O&C&M to I I&C&M to OHTER(%) AUC(%) HTER(%) AUC(%) HTER(%) AUC(%) HTER(%) AUC(%)
SSDG-M w/o triplet 21.19 83.54 26.78 79.10 23.93 74.86 25.43 80.52
SSDG-M w/o ssad 24.05 81.94 28.11 80.15 21.29 84.52 26.62 79.59
SSDG-M w/o norm 17.86 89.76 30.11 78.38 25.57 73.92 29.74 75.48
SSDG-M 16.67 90.47 23.11 85.45 18.21 94.61 25.17 81.83
SSDG-R w/o triplet 8.81 96.85 14.33 92.28 15.21 83.09 21.98 85.54
SSDG-R w/o ssad 11.19 95.10 12.89 94.08 12.14 96.63 18.06 90.43
SSDG-R w/o norm 10.24 96.58 12.78 95.06 12.64 92.92 15.99 91.26
SSDG-R 7.38 97.17 10.44 95.94 11.71 96.59 15.61 91.54
Table 2. Comparison results between the proposed method and the corresponding baseline method with different architectures.
Method O&C&I to M O&M&I to C O&C&M to I I&C&M to OHTER(%) AUC(%) HTER(%) AUC(%) HTER(%) AUC(%) HTER(%) AUC(%)
BDG-M 17.14 87.70 28.00 73.42 20.93 87.06 26.27 79.99
SSDG-M 16.67 90.47 23.11 85.45 18.21 94.61 25.17 81.83
BDG-R 9.52 93.52 12.78 94.38 12.86 93.06 16.46 91.39
SSDG-R 7.38 97.17 10.44 95.94 11.71 96.59 15.61 91.54
Our framework is implemented by PyTorch. And two
different architectures of the feature generator are adopted
for comparisons. The first one combines the feature genera-
tor with the feature embedder defined in MADDG [33]. For
the second one, we replace the last average pooling layer of
ResNet-18 [15] by the global pooling layer (GAP) and uti-
lize all the above layers of GAP. Specifically, we add a fully
connected layer (FC) as the bottleneck layer on top of each
feature generator, which consists of 512 hidden units. The
face anti-spoofing classifier is a simple linear model with a
2 nodes FC layer. And the domain discriminator contains
two FC layers with 512 and 3 nodes, respectively. We de-
note these two different architectures by M and R for short
in the following (i.e., SSDG-M and SSDG-R).
Evaluation Metrics. Following the work of [33], we
use the Half Total Error Rate (HTER) and the Area Un-
der Curve (AUC) as the evaluation metrics. Moreover, the
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) and some visual-
izations (t-SNE [25] and CAM [32]) are also reported to
further evaluate the performance.
4.2. Discussion
4.2.1 Influences of Each Network Component
We perform the ablation study to evaluate the performance
gained by each component for different network architec-
tures, i.e., the single-side adversarial learning (denoted as
ssad), the asymmetric triplet loss (denoted as triplet), and
the feature and weight normalization (denoted as norm).
The comparison results are shown in Table 1.
It can be seen that the performances of the proposed
method with different architectures both degrade if any
component is removed. The comparison results verify that
each component of SSDG contributes to performance im-
provement and the incorporation of all these components
can achieve the best results.
4.2.2 Comparisons with the Baseline Method
We further compare the SSDG method with the correspond-
ing baseline method, which aims to seek a generalized fea-
ture space for both the real and the fake faces. Specifi-
cally, we add another domain discriminator after the feature
generator to perform adversarial learning on both the real
and the fake features. Moreover, the proposed asymmetric
triplet loss is replaced with a two-category triplet loss to ag-
gregate all the fake faces as well as the real ones together.
Two different network architectures are adopted in the base-
line method for more comparisons (denoted as BDG-M and
BDG-R, respectively). The comparison results are shown
in Table 2.
Firstly, it can be seen that the performance of BDG-
M method is comparable with that of the state-of-the-art
MADDG method [33] shown in Table 5. The average
HTER results of them for all total testing tasks are 23.09%
and 23.05%, respectively. This is because the above two
methods both aim to seek a generalized feature space not
only for the real faces but also for the fake ones. In con-
trast, our SSDG method outperforms the BDG method as
well as the MADDG method on all testing tasks with differ-
ent network architectures, which demonstrates that seeking
a generalized feature space for fake faces is sub-optimal. As
Table 3. Comparison results of two different network architectures of the feature generator.
Backbones Flops(G) Params(M) Speed(FPS) Avg HTER(%) Avg AUC(%)
MADDG-based 47.59 3.35 36.40 20.79 88.09
ResNet18-based 2.38 11.18 149.15 11.29 93.81
Table 4. Comparison results of domain generalization with limited
source domains for face anti-spoofing.
Method M&I to C M&I to OHTER AUC HTER AUC
MS-LBP [26] 51.16 52.09 43.63 58.07
IDA [39] 45.16 58.80 54.52 42.17
CT [6] 55.17 46.89 53.31 45.16
LBP-TOP [9] 45.27 54.88 47.26 50.21
MADDG [33] 41.02 64.33 39.35 65.10
SSDG-M 31.89 71.29 36.01 66.88
Figure 4. Grad-CAM [32] visualizations of the SSDG method un-
der O&M&I to C. The first row shows the real faces and the second
shows the fake ones.
a result, it is more feasible for the face anti-spoofing task
to apply asymmetric optimization goals for the real and the
fake faces, which can get a class boundary, generalizing bet-
ter to unseen domains.
4.2.3 Visualizations of the Proposed Method
As shown in Figure 4, we adopt the Grad-CAM [32] to pro-
vide the class activation map (CAM) visualizations of our
method. It shows that the SSDG method always focuses on
the region of the internal face to seek discriminative cues
instead of the domain-specific backgrounds, illuminations,
etc., which is more likely to generalize well to unseen do-
mains. Specifically, for the fake faces, our method can pay
attention to different regions according to different attacks,
such as the eyes region of the face for the cut attack.
Moreover, as shown in Figure 5, we randomly select 200
samples of each category from four databases and plot the t-
SNE [25] visualizations to analyze the feature space learned
by the SSDG method and the corresponding baseline BDG
method. It can be seen that the SSDG method can make the
features of fake faces more dispersed in the feature space
compared to those of the BDG method. In contrast, the fea-
ture distribution of the real faces is more compact. There-
fore, a better class boundary can be achieved by the SSDG
(a) BDG-R (b) SSDG-R
Figure 5. The t-SNE [25] visualizations of the extracted features
by the BDG-R method (a) and the SSDG-R method (b) under the
O&M&I to C testing tasks (best viewed in color).
method, which generalizes well to the target domain.
4.2.4 Limited Source Domains
We also evaluate our method when extremely limited source
domains are available (i.e., only two source databases).
Specifically, MSU and Idiap databases are selected as the
source domains for training and the remaining two, i.e., CA-
SIA and OULU, respectively, are used as the target domains
for testing. As shown in Table 4, our proposed method
achieves the best performance, which has a significant im-
provement over other methods. Although only two source
domains are available, the SSDG method can still force the
features of fake faces to be dispersed in the feature space,
which promotes to learn a more generalized class boundary
for unseen domains.
4.2.5 Comparisons of Different Architectures
As shown in Table 3, we also compare two different ar-
chitectures of the feature generator, i.e., MADDG-based
and ResNet18-based networks, respectively, to evaluate
the effects of different backbones. Specifically, the Avg
HTER and AUC represent the average results of four test-
ing tasks. And the inference speed of each architecture is
tested on the OULU database on a single NVIDIA TITAN
1080 GPU with 256×256 image resolution. It can be seen
that the ResNet18-based network is more suitable than the
MADDG-based one for face anti-spoofing not only in terms
of accuracy but also in terms of speed. And we believe
that much better performance can be achieved by the SSDG
method with more effective networks.
Figure 6. ROC curves of four testing tasks for domain generalization on face anti-spoofing.
Table 5. Comparison results between the proposed method and state-of-the-art methods for domain generalization on face anti-spoofing.
Method O&C&I to M O&M&I to C O&C&M to I I&C&M to OHTER(%) AUC(%) HTER(%) AUC(%) HTER(%) AUC(%) HTER(%) AUC(%)
MS-LBP [26] 29.76 78.50 54.28 44.98 50.30 51.64 50.29 49.31
Binary CNN [42] 29.25 82.87 34.88 71.94 34.47 65.88 29.61 77.54
IDA [39] 66.67 27.86 55.17 39.05 28.35 78.25 54.20 44.59
Color Texture [6] 28.09 78.47 30.58 76.89 40.40 62.78 63.59 32.71
LBP-TOP [9] 36.90 70.80 42.60 61.05 49.45 49.54 53.15 44.09
Auxiliary (Depth) 22.72 85.88 33.52 73.15 29.14 71.69 30.17 77.61
Auxiliary [23] - - 28.40 - 27.60 - - -
MADDG [33] 17.69 88.06 24.50 84.51 22.19 84.99 27.89 80.02
SSDG-M 16.67 90.47 23.11 85.45 18.21 94.61 25.17 81.83
SSDG-R 7.38 97.17 10.44 95.94 11.71 96.59 15.61 91.54
4.3. Comparison with State-of-the-art Methods
As shown in Table 5 and Figure 6, our method out-
performs all the state-of-the-art methods under four test-
ing tasks, which demonstrates the effectiveness of the
SSDG method. This is because all other face anti-spoofing
methods [6, 9, 23, 26, 39, 42] except for the MADDG
[33] method pay no attention to the intrinsic distribution
relationship among different domains. Therefore, only
database-biased features can be extracted, which causes sig-
nificant performance degradation in case of cross-database
testing scenarios. Although the MADDG method exploits
the DG approach to extract common discriminative cues,
the results show that seeking a generalized feature space for
both the real and the fake faces is difficult to optimize, usu-
ally leading to a sub-optimal solution. Due to the diversity
of attack types and database collection ways, the extracted
features of fake faces are more widely distributed in the fea-
ture space than those of real ones, making it nontrivial to ag-
gregate all of them from different domains together. There-
fore, our SSDG method applies asymmetric optimization
goals for the real and the fake faces to learn a more gener-
alized feature space. Moreover, it shows that when we re-
sort to using the ResNet18-based network, a significant im-
provement can be made, indicating that better performance
can be achieved when the SSDG approach is combined with
a more effective network.
4.4. Conclusion
To improve the generalization ability of face anti-
spoofing, we propose a novel end-to-end single-side domain
generalization framework. Our SSDG learns a generalized
feature space, where the feature distribution of real faces
is compact while that of fake ones is dispersed across do-
mains. This is quite different from existing methods treat-
ing both real and fake faces symmetrically. To achieve this
“single-side” goal, the single-side adversarial learning and
the asymmetric triplet loss are designed to train the model
aggregating the real faces and separating the fake ones from
different domains. Extensive experiments show that our
SSDG is effective and achieves state-of-the-art results on
four public databases. In summary, our work implies that
the distribution of real faces and that of fake ones are in-
deed different, and thus suggests that treating them asym-
metrically can lead to better generalization ability to unseen
domains. Other possible asymmetric design can be further
explored in the future, for instance, dividing the fake faces
according to the attack types rather than the databases.
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